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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY SKIBA,
Pmintiff and Respondent,

vs.
HOMESTEAD MINERALS CORPORAOIL CORPORATION, a oorporaOIL CORPORATION, A corporation,

Case No.
11677

Defendant and Appelmnt.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent seeks to require Appellant to transfer for
a sale some 10,000 shares of its common stock which ReSPondent acquired in a "private placement" transaction
under an investment letter.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was heard May 1, 1969, by the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, on an Order to Show Cause served on
Appellant. Briefs were thereafter filed and on May 7, 1969,
the Court signed its Findings, Conclusions and Decree re-
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quiring Appellant to transfer Respondent's stock and permit sale thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court decree,
claiming that it would be unlawful under Federal Securities law to require free transfer of "investment" stock.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 29, 1968, Respondent conveyed to Appellant an interest in certain mining claims in Nevada for
which Respondent was issued 10,000 shares of Appellant's
nonassessable common stock under Certificate No. 4982.
The certificate was not issued until April 16, 1968, but
was pursuant to the earlier transaction. The certificate
bears an investment legend stating:
"Investment stock not subject to transfer until
the 29th day of March, 1969."
The stock was issued by Appellant without any securities registration in accordance with the exemption from
registration popularly known as the "private placement"
exemption under the provisions of Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended. (R. 25)
On July 9, 1968, Respondent Skiba was issued 1,111
shares of the nonassessable common stock of Appellant
represented by Certificate No. 6493, again in exchange for
certain mining interests. That stock was also issued under
the "private placement" exemption but the certificate bears
a different form of investment legend stating:
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"Investment stock not subject to transfer until
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or a
prior opinion of counsel, satisfactory to the issuer,
that registration is not required under the Act."
(R. 22 and 24)
After March 29, 1969, Respondent presented Certificate No. 4982 for 10,000 shares to the transfer agent of
Appellant and requested an issue of new certificates for
10,000 shares of stock without any investment legend. Appellant refused to effect the requested transfer. (R. 26)
This action was subsequently brought to compel such transfer free of restriction so that Respondent could sell all or
part of the 10,000 shares made the subject of this action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INVESTMENT PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW
HAS NOT EXPIRED AND THE PARTIES WOULD
BE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW IN SELLING OR TRANSFERRING UNREGISTERED
STOCK.
In approaching the question of what constitutes. a
sufficient "holding period" to permit lawful sale of investment stock acquired in a private placement transaction,
Appellant is admittedly in a rather embarrassing position
in this particular case. The stock certificate involved in
this action bears an investment legend indicating:
"Investment stock not subject to transfer until
the 29th day of March, 1969."
Notwithstanding the specified date on the stock certifi-
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cate, Appellant claims that it is not permitted by law to
effect a transfer of the stock free of the investment restriction. The only answer to this incongruity is that the
investment legend placed on the stock in that particular
transaction was placed there by former management of
Appellant without benefit of counsel. Respondent claims,
of course, that he had a contract with Appellant permitting
transfer of the investment shares following March 29,
1969. However logical that argument may appear, however, it should even more clearly appear from the law
cited herein that investment stock acquired in a private
placement transaction cannot be freely transferred upon
the expiration of any particular holding period unless
clearance is obtained from the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The erroneous assumption of law engaged in
by prior management of Appellant will not constitute a
ground for evading the law as Respondent is now requesting.

It is well known to this Court that the purpose of a
private placement transaction is to issue stock in a transaction not involving members of the public. Presumably, the
person receiving the stock without a full registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission is sufficiently
knowledgeable to fend for himself in acquiring information
regarding the issuing corporation. The public at large is
entitled to the protection of the information required in a
registration statement and prospectus. Nevertheless, certain
investment stock can be sold under rules and guidelines that
are loosely stated in SEC practice. The matter of a "holding
period" for investment stock, as evidence that the stock was
taken for investment and not for public distribution, is
somewhat elusive. The most intelligent discussion of the
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problems surrounding investment stock are contained in a
recent document known as "The Wheat Report," constituting
a detailed study by the SEC staff, chairmaned by Francis
M. Wheat, one of the SEC commissioners. The report is
more properly entitled "Disclosure to Investors, a reappraisal of federal administrative policies under the '33
and '34 Acts." The report is widely distributed through
the auspices of Commerce Clearing House, Inc., and a. copy
of the complete report is found in the Utah State Law
Library. Believing this to be a valid source of authority
establishing current SEC practice and affiliated law, quotations from the report will be most helpful. The Wheat
study describes the present problem as follows :
"2. Problems associated with present doctrine
and their consequences.
(a)

'How long do I have to hold?'

The Commission has indicated that 'one evidentiary fact' to be considered in determining whether
or not a private purchaser took with the necessary
investment intent is the length of time between acquisition of the securities and resale. 18
Will any particular holding period furnish sufficient evidence of investment intent? No definite
answer is available. In the language of the Commission's statement, the weight to be given to the
holding period will vary with the circumstances of
each case. Of course, the longer the period of retention, the more persuasive would be the argument
is securities

Act Release No. 3825
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that the resale is not at variance with original "investment intent" . . .14
Other pronouncements on this subject by the
Commission and its staff furnish little additional
clarification.15 In its opinion in the Crowell-Collier
case, 16 the Commission observed that ' . . . holding
for one year does not afford a statutory basis for
an exemption . . .' Subsequent to Crowell-Collier,
former Chairman (then Commissioner) Cohen remarked that a presumption of investment intent
might arise after a two-year holding, a statement
which has sometimes been referred to as the 'Cohen
two-year rule.' Its author clearly indicated, however,
that certain kinds of factual situations would negate
any such presumption, despite the period of holding.17
A very recent comment on the subject by an experienced private practitioner is as follows:
... As a practical matter, the shares may
. . . be sold in any manner after the lapse of a
sufficient amount of time, the period being
rather indefinite but probably two to three
years. For the record, however, it is official
dogma that if stock is acquired for investment,
a lapse of time (no matter how long) does not
automatically free the stock from restrictions
on resale. (Footnote 'omitted) 18
Id.
0mitted
16 Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. Securities Act Release
No. 3825, p. 7 (August 12, 1957).
11 SEC Problems
of Controlling Stockholders and in
Underwritings, 30-31 (Israels, ed., 1962).
18 Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal Securities
Laws-A Program for Reform, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1323,
1337 (1968).
14
15
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Members of the Commission's staff have on
occasion advised investors who hold privately placed
debt securities that the staff would not look with
disfavor on a resale after five years." (The Wheat
Report, 164, 165)
The stock of Respondent made the subject of this action
was issued in April 1968 but was effective as of the transaction date, February 29, 1968. In even the most liberal of
the SEC interpretations cited above, a holding period of at
least two years must exist as one of the factors the SEC will
consider in whether or not investment stock may be sold
to the public without registration. Since Respondent here
is attempting to sell his stock without restriction (R. 12),
he may create various civil and criminal liabilities of the
Securities Act of 1933 unless all of the legal factors exist
which are required by the SEC. It has been conceded by
Appellant that the legend placed on Respondent's stock
under instructions of previous management may have been
deficient in form. It is here submitted, however, that
Appellant should not be required to participate in an illegal
action merely to correct the deficiency in form or to permit
a public sale of unregistered stock. The courts should refuse
to enforce a contract where such enforcement would create
an illegal result. Haddock vs. Salt Lake City (1901) 23 Utah
521, 65 Pac. 491 and Neil vs. Utah Wholesale Grocery (1922)
61 Utah 22, 210 Pac. 201.
Respondent has not satisfactorily rebutted the presumption that the securities were acquired by him from
Appellant for investment and that the requested transfer
may be made without creating a violation of the federal
registration requirements. It has been repeatedly held that
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the party seeking to establish that securities have been
acquired under the provision of an exemption from the
registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act
of 1933 (called the "Act" in this brief) rests with the party
claiming exemption. U. S. vs. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,
376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967). (See CCH Federal Securities
Law Reporter, Volume 1, Paragraph 2850.126 for additional
citations.) If, as a matter of fact, Respondent acquired
the securities, with a view to distribution, he would be
considered an "underwriter" under the provisions of Section
2 ( 11) of the Act. The issue of securities to Respondent by
Appellant would constitute a distribution of securities by
an issuer through an underwriter, which by definition
could not be done lawfully under the provisions of Section
4 (2). Any further sale by Respondent as an underwriter
would certainly be unlawful.
Respondent alleges in Paragraph 3 of the complaint
(R. 1) that a sufficient amount of time has elapsed since
the acquisition of securities in question by him to rebut any
presumption that such were acquired for investment and
that, therefore, the certificates may now be transferred
and the acquired securities disposed of. Such allegation
does not conform with law, and the lower court's finding
that Appellant's defenses are "without merit" (R. 26) is
most untenable.
In 1957, the Commission issued an additional interpretation of the exemption upon which the Respondent relies,
which stated in pertinent part as follows :
"Holding for the six month capital gains period
of the tax statute, holding in an 'investment account'
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rather than a 'trading account,' holding for a deferred
sale, holding for a market rise, holding for sale if
the market does not rise, or holding for a year does
not afford a statutory basis for an exemption and,
therefore, does not provide an adequate basis on
which counsel may give opinions or businessmen rely
in selling securities without registration. Purchasing
for the purpose of future sales is nonetheless purchasing for sale and, if the transaction involves any
public offering even at some future dat.e, the registration provisions apply unless at the time of the
public offering an exemption is available." Securities
Act Release No. 33-3825.
Since Respondent has not held the securities involved
for a period of at least two years prior to an attempted
disposition thereof, it is respectfully submitted that neither
the Appellant nor the court can conclude that the presumption that the securities were acquired for distribution has
been satisfactorily rebutted and, therefore, the requested
relief should have been denied by the lower court.
Assuming the stock in question is transferred and sold,
who would stand to lose? If the exemption cannot be supported and is not available, Respondent violates Section 5
of the Act by selling unregistered stock, so that the transaction is subject to rescission or Respondent is liable for
damages. The liability would also attach to the broker who
is the agent of Respondent and may encompass the broker's
salesmen, even though they are unaware the stock was not
exempt. More seriously, from our point of view, there is
authority to the effect that the liability would attach to
Appellant as the issuer. See S.E.C. vs. Mono-Kearsarge
Consolidated Mining Company, 167 F. Supp. 248, (U. S.
D. C., Utah, 1958). Although that case involves the issuance
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of an injunction against sales and transfers of unregistered
stock, and civil liability was not immediately involved, much
of the Court's language could be used to support civil liability on the basis that the corporation in fact contemplated
or acquiesced in a subsequent public redistribution of unregistered stock.
POINT II
THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW RESPONDENT'S
"CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" NECESSARY TO
CLAIM ANY EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION.
In Paragraph 3 of the complaint, Respondent alleges:
". . . plaintiff has sustained a change in his
investment intent which now permit.s him to sell said
shares of stock ..." (R. 1)
Such allegation can refer to no factor other than a "change
in circumstances," which is one of the factors considered
by the court.s in determining the validity of stock sales
under an exemption from registration.
The question then arises, is an immediate sale permissible because of a sufficient change in Respondent's
circumstances as would, in effect, not negate the original
representation that the acquisition had been for investment
purposes? It seems that Respondent's complaint is predicated entirely upon this theory. The Wheat Report describes
the problem as follows:
"(b) What is a sufficient 'change of circumstances?'
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As noted above, the 'change of circums.tances'
doctrine resulted from the felt need for an affirmative demonstration of an original investment intent.
If an investor suffers a 'change of circumstances'
between his original purchase and his subsequent
resale, one can argue on the basis of factual evidence
that resale was not contemplated from the very start.
But what is a sufficient 'change of circumstances'
for this purpose?
This has always been a troublesome question.

In the first place, a change that could reasonably
have been anticipated at the time of purchase will
be of no evidentiary value."

* * *

Secondly, it has been held that no change of
circumstances occurs where investors anticipate
business success only to be disappointed by actual
results. 20 There is an analogous proposition: neither
an advance nor a decline in the market value of the
securities purchased can constitute a valid 'change
of circumstanoes.' 21
Thirdly, the substantiality of the required
'change of circumstances' varies directly with the
length of time between purchase and sale. The
shorter the time, the more drastic the required
change. Is there a minimum period, in all events?
This is unclear, and
... prudent counsel would prefer to see the
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F. 2d 461, 468 (2d
Cir., 1959) cert. den. 361 U.S. 896.
21 Crowell Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
20
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passage of at least two years as partial basis
for his opinion that sale may be made because
of a change of circumstances which was not
contemplated at the time the security wa.s
originally acquired."22
In most of the reported cases, the changes in circumstances were considered to be an insufficient basis for the
claim of exemption. (See Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
119, 142, 1959). The change of circumstances theory is
obviously somewhat elusive also. We submit, therefore, that
Respondent's complaint fails to establish a statutory basis
for an exemption under an alleged change of circumstances.
Of more importance to the present determination, however, is the complete absence of any evidence in the record
sustaining Respondent's claim of a change in circumstances,
nor has Respondent asked for a hearing to present such
evidence. The lower court was disposed to rule for Respondent as a matter of law, but certainly such ruling was
premature and improper without any evidence in the record
against which Respondent's claims could be tested.
Respondent has not exhausted all other possible remedies in that there is no evidence he has made any
request to the SEC for a "no-action" letter which would
protect Respondent and Appellant from any injunctive or
similar action being instituted by the Commission, if the
requested transfer is made. Such a letter might be obtained
22When Corporations Go Public, 20, (Israels and Duff,
Jr., eds., 1962).
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from the Commission upon a proper showing of change in
Respondent's circumstances. (The Wheat Report, p. 156.)
POINT III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM SELLING
THE SUBJECT STOCK IN APPELLANT CORPORATION BECAUSE OF HIS OWNERSHIP OF OTHER
INVESTMENT STOCK AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE SEC'S "FUNGIBILITY" NOTION
The record evidences that Respondent's 10,000 shares
of Homestead Minerals Corporation Common Stock was
acquired prior to April 16, 1968, as part of an issue under
contract effective February 29, 1968. (R. 25, 26) Subsequently, and on July 9, 1968, Respondent obtained. an additional 1,111 shares of investment stock bearing the legend:
"Investment stock not subject 1;o transfer until
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or a
prior opinion of counsel, satisfactory to the issuer,
that registration is not required under the Act."
Respondent's acquisition of such st.ock under the more
rigorous investment representation falls squarely within the
rule that all st.ock is deemed to be held for investment if
part of it is held under investment restrictions, irrespective
of the manner and time of purchase of any of the st.ock.
The SEC counsel and staff have promulgated and are
enforcing a theory to the effect that if a person holds investment stock from a corporation, all stock of the same issuer
held by him, whether obtained in the market or otherwise,
is "tainted" by the investment intent. He is thus prohibited
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from selling any of his stock of that corporation until it is
registered or otherwise made exempt from registration.
Sometimes called the "fungibility notion," the theory has not
yet been enshrined in any statute, regulation, or judicial
decision. It is effectively described in a very interesting
article: Kennedy-"The Case of the Scarlet Letter or the
Easy Way Out 'Private Offering'" The Business Lawyer,
Vol. 23, No. 1, November, 1967.
More authoritatively, the Wheat Report states:
"(d) The peculiar effects of the 'fungibility

concept.'

If there is to be an 'investment intent' test for
exemption under the '33 Act, the fungibility of securities purchased at different times is essential to i1;s
integrity. An example will illustrate the concept:
A purchases 10,000 shares of the common
stock of a particular issuer in the trading market. One year later he acquires 10,000 additional
shares directly from the same issuer in a nonpublic transaction. Ten days after the latter
transaction, without having experienced any
'change of circumstances,' A seeks a 'no-action'
letter from the Commission's staff regarding
the proposed sale to the public of the 10,000
shares he purchased in the trading market. The
'no-action' request would be denied. All of the
shares now held by A would be deemed to be
restricted against public sale."

* * *

" 'Fungibility' also applies, of course, when successive blocks of the same security are purchased in
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a series of private offerings. A special application
of the fungibility doctrine relates to so-called 'contingent stock' issued in acquisitions. Assume that
company A acquires company B from its 7 shareholders, agreeing to issue 50,000 shares of A's common stock in exchange for the stock of B, and also
agreeing that if B's business maintains or achieves
certain levels of profitability (and not otherwise)
the 7 shareholders of B will be entitled, five years
later, to an additional 25,000 shares of A. C, one of
the 7 shareholders of B, receives 2,000 shares as his
portion of the 'contingent' block of 25,000 shares.
A month later he decides to sell a portion of the
shares acquired by him five years previously. The
Commission's staff, in denying no action requests
under similar circumstances, takes the position that
the receipt of the 'contingent' shares starts a new
holding period as to all shares of the same class then
held by C.
In application, the present 'fungibility concept'
bears little relationship to the needs of investors for
disclosure. It has never been formalized as a Commission rule or interpretative release, and hence
introduces an additional element of uncertainty into
an already clouded situation. It is essential, however,
to prevent evasion of registration requirements under
present interpretations of the exemptive provisions."
Because of that position of the SEC, Respondent may
not dispose of any securities of Appellant held by him until
he has satisfactorily established that all securities acquired
by him from Appellant for investment are no longer under
any restriction upon their further transfer.
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CONCLUSION
By reason of the foregoing, it must be concluded:
(a) Respondent's holding period of investment stock
does not fulfill even the two year minimum spoken of by
the SEC authorities;
(b) No change of circumstances has been shown in
fulfillment of another of the SEC's requirements;
(c) Respondent's more recently acquired investment
stock with more restrictive investment representations requires all of his stock to be so held until registration.
Accordingly, Appellant requests this Court to reverse
the lower court's final order and judgment, with consequent
dismissal of the action.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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DON B. ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

